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Abstract 
The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Intervention (the Intervention) of 2007 was a 
bold experiment by the Howard Government. The Intervention was developed quickly without 
comprehensive policy development based on evidence or consultation. During its five-year statutory 
life (ending August 2012), the absence of coherent policy logic has seen the Intervention fundamentally 
reframed by the Rudd and Gillard Governments. The unprecedented and controversial nature of the 
Intervention has seen extraordinary levels of monitoring, review and evaluation, but the absence of an 
overarching evaluation strategy has resulted in a fragmented and confused approach. In this article, we 
do not seek to critique the Intervention itself or to assess whether these multiple monitoring and 
evaluation exercises have been successes or failures. Indeed, our review illustrates that in highly 
contested policy areas, notions of success, failure and the evaluations themselves become politically 
charged. Instead we make a series of critical observations regarding this contradictory messiness of 
evaluations, using political science and anthropological frameworks to draw wider conclusions about 
the nature and logic of evaluation fetishism. We conclude that evaluations of the Intervention have not 
led to greater transparency, accountability and monitoring of outcomes and outputs. The Intervention 
evaluations instead are consistent with the view that they are both obfuscating mechanisms and 
techniques of governance designed to allay public concern and normalise the governance of 
marginalised Indigenous Australian spaces.  
 
On 21 June 2007, the Howard-led Australian Government launched the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) Intervention.2 From the beginning, the 
Intervention was emotive, highly political and controversial. The moral authority to 
intervene was garnered from a year’s worth of intensifying media coverage of child 
abuse and neglect (Macoun 2012). The politics was linked to the declaration of a 
‘national emergency’ in the run-up to a federal election. 
The Rudd Opposition accepted the premise of a national emergency and supported 
the Intervention. Later in 2007, the incoming Rudd Government sought to reframe the 
Intervention by linking it to the ‘Closing the Gap’ strategy, while articulating a 
commitment to evidence-based policy making. This was especially the case in 
Indigenous affairs, where ideology was perceived as taking precedence over cogent 
                                                
1  We would like to thank George Argyrous for steering the project on which this article is based; Tess Lea,  
David Marsh and two anonymous referees for reviewing; Elisabeth Yarbakhsh and Juliett Checketts for 
comments; Tess Altman for assistance with editing; and participants at a seminar ‘The NTER Intervention - 
The role of evidence in framing normalisation’ delivered in December 2011 at the Australian National 
University for their input. 
2  The Northern Territory National Emergency Response (NTNER) intervention is also referred to as the 
Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) and the Intervention. We will generally use the forms ‘the 
Intervention’ and ‘the NTER’. 
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argument and factual information (Evans 2006; Rudd 2008). In addition, because the 
Government was at once looking for cooperative federalism and State and Territory 
financial commitments, there was a call for a high degree of transparency and 
accountability for dollar inputs, program outputs and outcomes in Indigenous affairs.  
Such commitments would appear to augur well for a critical evidence-based policy 
evaluation of the Intervention. As Maddison and Denniss (2009, 177) note, ‘No policy 
should ever be implemented and then abandoned. Evaluation is a crucial element of 
good policy work, which produces specific advice about the future development – or 
abandonment – of a particular approach to solving a social problem’. Available 
evidence indicates that the links between policy development and evaluation in the 
case of the Intervention were problematic, in part as a consequence of the politically 
contested space. In any policy area that provokes controversy, there are usually two 
competing narratives: ‘the conflict and the meta-conflict – the conflict about the 
nature of conflict itself’ (Shore 2011, 180). In relation to evaluations of the 
Intervention there have been two competing narratives: conflict over the interpretation 
of evaluation findings (with the Australian Government mobilising a dominant 
narrative of implementation success), and the meta-conflict about the integrity and 
validity of such evaluation techniques.  
Initially, we planned to systemically ‘evaluate the evaluations’ in order to examine 
how the Australian Government might assess whether the Intervention was working 
and when it might be time to ‘exit’ prescribed communities. This would have been a 
simple policy question of when the job of normalisation might be deemed complete 
and special Intervention measures might end. Yet this seemingly straightforward 
question became increasingly complex.  
As we began our research in June 2011, the Australian Government announced that 
the Intervention would continue beyond June 2012 and released a discussion paper, 
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory (Australian Government 2011a). Any 
notion that exit was a serious possibility was quashed. As such, we recalibrated our 
research question to ask how the Australian Government might know if the 
Intervention was a policy success. But the exercise of trying to determine whether or 
not the Intervention was successful raised the important first order issue: what is, or 
was, the Intervention? This is an important question to answer because it is difficult – 
arguably impossible – to evaluate a policy if it is constantly in flux on issues of 
content, target population and timeframe.  
We thus begin this review by seeking to define the Intervention policy, and how it 
has been reconfigured (or in the Government’s term ‘redesigned’) over time. We then 
use two frameworks to analyse the role of evaluation in the Intervention: Marsh and 
McConnell’s (2010a) heuristic for measuring success (including process, 
programmatic and political dimensions), and an anthropological perspective on the 
logic and meaning of policy evaluation in the context of contemporary power 
relations (Shore and Wright 2011). Subsequently, we delineate what evaluative work 
has been done to assess this shifting policy and its numerous program components.  
In attempting to classify and categorise what might constitute such an evaluation 
corpus, we found ourselves shadow-boxing with the state, for just as we established 
its parameters the Australian Government was completing the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Evaluation Report 2011 (Australian Government 2011b). As 
already noted, the limits of space and scope deter us from appraising all the 
evaluations. Instead we make a series of critical observations about the evidence base. 
We do so in part to highlight that the evaluation corpus has itself become co-opted 
into the policy arena, with a majority of evaluations undertaken by government 
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departments and paid consultants. We then return to our two analytic frameworks, 
applying them in tandem to the Intervention evaluations to allow us to address wider 
political questions. Our assessment concludes that it is impossible to say if the 
Intervention has been a success, a failure, or neither; results have been mixed, and 
questions about whether better or more sustainable outcomes might have been 
achieved have generally not been asked.3  
What is perhaps even more significant is that in this case it appears evaluation 
itself is not a tool for objectively measuring success or failure but rather forms a part 
of the policy process. The sheer quantitative significance of evaluations undertaken 
has not led to greater clarity, but instead has obfuscated the effects and effectiveness 
of the Intervention. Our conclusion employs the idiom ‘too much dreaming’, and asks 
what all this evaluation has really achieved in relation to policy formation. This 
question brings into sharp relief a key point: that perhaps such a politically charged 
and culturally sensitive policy area as the Intervention cannot and should not be 
evaluated in conventional public policy terms. Key aspects of the Intervention have 
been locked in until 2022, without clear evidence for or understanding of the 
differences made from 2007–2012, what the Intervention has been for, or what it may 
become. 
What is, or was, the Intervention: A carefully adapted policy frame 
The Intervention, announced on 21 June 2007, was a set of measures aimed to protect 
children. It followed the release of Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle – Little 
Children are Sacred, a report chaired by Wild and Anderson and commissioned by 
the Northern Territory Government (Northern Territory Board of Inquiry 2007). At its 
outset the Intervention included controversial measures such as compulsory blanket 
quarantining of welfare income, which required suspension of the Racial 
Discrimination Act; the compulsory leasing of township precincts without the consent 
of land-owners; and the provision of unprecedented powers to the police and 
government-appointed business managers. The Intervention was to last five years, to 
21 June 2012, and had the broad aim to stabilise, normalise and then exit 73 
‘prescribed communities’ in the Northern Territory. Specific measures included 
(Hinkson 2007: 1–2): 
• alcohol restrictions; 
• welfare reforms (especially compulsory income management); 
• enforcing school attendance;  
• compulsory (quickly changed to voluntary) health checks for children; 
• acquisition of 73 prescribed townships;  
• increased policing;  
• housing and tenancy reform;  
• banning pornography;  
• scrapping the permit system; and  
• reforming governance with the appointment of managers of all government 
business in prescribed communities. 
                                                
3  For example, irrespective of the reported and case-specific benefits of income management, could more 
sustainable financial management skills or better nutrition have been achieved for the estimated $500 million 
(Buckmaster et al. 2012) to be spent on this measure by 2014? 
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With the passage of five new laws in August 2007, the Intervention consisted of seven 
measures, each with a number of sub-measures (totaling 36):  
• welfare reform and employment;  
• promoting law and order;  
• enhancing education;  
• supporting families;  
• improving child and family health;  
• housing and land reform; and  
• coordination (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010). 
In November 2007 there was a change of government but, surprisingly, the NTER 
was not fundamentally altered or abandoned. The set of Intervention programs, 
quickly devised as a policy package a few days prior to 21 June 2007, were caught up 
in a political process of continual adaptation and reframing. Under the Rudd 
Government, the NTER became entangled in the new national policy focus on a 
highly statistical ‘Closing the Gap’ strategy. The Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) further enmeshed these programs in a series of National Partnership 
Agreements (NPAs) – a new institutional form – that were the foundation of an 
umbrella National Indigenous Reform Agreement.4 Under the institutional umbrella 
of COAG, all governments agreed to six Closing the Gap targets, first announced as a 
part of the National Apology to the Stolen Generations in February 2008.5 
The Intervention was transformed from late 2008, especially after an independent 
(government-appointed) Review Board endorsed its continuation. These reforms, 
which Altman (2008) termed ‘the new “quiet revolution” in Indigenous affairs’, saw 
the dissipation of certain Intervention measures. Housing was no longer a part of the 
Intervention, but instead a part of the NPA on Remote Indigenous Housing, while 15 
of the largest prescribed communities in the Northern Territory became priority 
communities under the NPA for Remote Service Delivery.  
There has been a concerted effort by the Australian Government to alter the 
discourse about the NTER and Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory, with an 
intergovernmental commitment to a major ‘independent’ evaluation during the 2011–
2012 financial year. At the same time as Closing the Gap was launched and carefully 
monitored,6 a process was underway to redesign the NTER. On 21 June 2010, perhaps 
symbolically on the anniversary of the Intervention, legislation was passed that 
removed suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act, provided exemption 
possibilities and extended income management to non-Indigenous welfare recipients. 
The Australian Government has since defined income management as a welfare 
reform measure, rather than as an Intervention measure.7  
 The summary narrative provided here is intended to demonstrate the adaptive 
changes in the Intervention from 2007–2012, even while most NTER laws remained 
unchanged. Its continuation, rebadged as Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory, 
                                                
4  The Partnership Agreements focused on economic development, family and community safety, health, remote 
service delivery, and housing. 
5  The Closing the Gap targets were on life expectancy, child mortality, employment, and three on education. An 
NPA to Close the Gap in the Northern Territory was signed between the Australian and Northern Territory 
Governments for the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2012.  
6  Monitoring involved two-part six-monthly Closing the Gap Monitoring Reports. The latest and possibly last 
for the period July–December 2011 was released on 21 June 2012, the fifth anniversary of the Intervention. 
7  Although Closing the Gap monitoring reports continue to quantify those in the Northern Territory under the 
BasicsCard (income management) regime. 
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passed into law on 29 June 2012 and locked in a range of commitments by the Gillard 
Government for a ten-year period to 2022. Yet as Lovell (2012) has recently shown, 
while the Howard, Rudd and Gillard Governments have been committed to the 
Intervention, the major political discourses used by the Coalition and Labor 
governments to justify the Intervention have been very different. The Coalition 
Government used a discourse of failure and problematic culture to represent 
communities as dysfunctional and unsafe for children (also see Macoun 2012). In 
contrast, the Labor Government has shown a contradictory focus on human rights and 
maintenance of the Intervention on one hand, and on the other a narrow conception of 
‘development as mainstreaming’ that devalues Aboriginal perspectives and privileges 
a single modernisation pathway to development. Altman (2009a) has argued that, 
from an Indigenous standpoint, the Closing the Gap framework at the core of current 
Indigenous policy is based on the assumption that the Indigenous population aspires 
to attain Western norms – an assumption that has not been discussed, let alone 
negotiated, with the subjects of the Intervention.8 
We make three points illustrating the difficulty in defining and delimiting the 
Intervention on which evaluations are based. First, we note that over five years the 
Intervention has broadened its discursive framing considerably from an initial focus 
on children to a far broader focus on sustainable communities and progress in 
achieving Closing the Gap targets. Paradoxically, the definition of the Intervention 
has also been refined, so that key initial elements like housing and income 
management are no longer regarded as Intervention measures by the Government, 
while effectively remaining unchanged. Second, the population and communities 
targeted by the Intervention have altered from the initial 73 prescribed communities 
with a population of about 32,000 Indigenous people, to over 600 communities with 
an estimated population of 45,000. The major difference is that over 500 smaller 
outstation, homeland, pastoral, and town camp communities have now been included. 
In a statistical sense this change is important. Third, the timeframe for the 
Intervention is unclear. Most of the formal government evaluation was completed by 
November 2011, in preparation for the rapid development and passage of Stronger 
Futures laws. However, the last vestiges of the original Intervention laws did not end 
until August 2012, when compulsory township leasing arrangements expired, so 
arguably the final evaluation occurred too early.9  
Political and anthropological perspectives on evaluation10 
There are frequent government claims in the media that the Intervention has been a 
success. Selected data from evaluations have often been mobilised as the ‘evidence’ 
for such claims. Marsh and McConnell (2010a) argue that claims of policy success are 
commonplace in political life, but that few of these justifications are supported in a 
systematic way. They propose a framework for assessing success that focuses on three 
                                                
8    For example, an outcome that may be deemed a policy success would be the retention of Indigenous children 
in schools, However, if this leads to loss of Indigenous languages, then from what standpoint is this measured 
as a success? 
9  Census data, collected in August 2011, was coincidentally first released on 21 June 2012, the fifth anniversary 
of the Intervention. These official statistics will hence provide the most comprehensive means to assess change 
between 2006 and 2011 (see Altman 2012b). 
10  We recognise that many other perspectives could also be used, including from the growing disciplinary fields 
of audit and evaluation studies and crisis management studies. However given that we seek to understand the 
political meaning of evaluation in the context of Intervention, we deem the political and anthropological 
frameworks we have chosen most appropriate for this type of analysis. 
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dimensions: programmatic, political and process. In later work (Marsh and 
McConnell 2010b), they illustrate how these three dimensions might overlap and be 
related.  
This is a useful framework for determining what is meant by ‘success’, and for 
exploring the relationship between success and evaluation, in the context of the 
Intervention. Referring to Marsh and McConnell’s (2010a) success ‘trifecta’ – 
programmatic, political and process – evaluations of the Intervention have focused on 
programmatic success, asking whether policy elements achieved intended outcomes, 
although rarely whether the program was an efficient use of resources. This is not 
unusual, as Marsh and McConnell (2010a: 565) note: ‘Much of the evaluation 
literature is produced from within government, but rarely, if ever, moves beyond the 
assumption that success equate[s] with meeting policy objectives or producing 
“better” policy’.  
Paradoxically, given the technocratic focus on outcomes and programmatic 
success, the evaluations have occurred in an environment devoid of overarching 
policy or program logic. The Australian Government published a comprehensive 400 
page Northern Territory Emergency Response Evaluation Report 2011, which 
discusses the Australian Government’s ‘evaluation strategy’ and refers to a program 
logic that was developed by specialist consultants ‘to aid understanding of the whole-
of-government evaluation of the NTER’. Upon attempting to track down the report 
detailing this program logic, we found reference to an unpublished report 
Development of Program Logic Options for the NTER, prepared by ARTD 
Consultants and WestWood Spice in 2010. Unfortunately, repeated requests to senior 
Commonwealth Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) officials for a copy of this report proved fruitless at 
time of writing.11 The preparation of this unsighted report in late 2009 reinforces our 
view that the initial 2007 Intervention had no policy or program logic. Hence our 
focus here will be on the political and process dimensions of success.12  
This success heuristic proves particularly interesting in the Intervention policy 
arena. As Marsh and McConnell note: ‘When we study policy success we are 
immediately faced with the classic political science issue of power, and contestation 
over interpretation of context and outcome’. We address such issues through an 
anthropological framework, drawing on a burgeoning literature regarding 
contemporary power and policy processes. In the context of the Intervention, where 
the Western values of a dominant group are being imposed on populations that might 
either oppose or contest them, anthropology seems ideally placed to provide 
perspectives from Indigenous communities on the effectiveness of such policies in a 
contested intercultural space. To date, there have been few holistic, community-based 
evaluations of the Intervention using anthropological methods such as participant 
observation with small populations.13  
Shore’s (2011a, 169–186) research on a form of ‘intervention’ – the British Secret 
Service and the War on Iraq – is instructive, and resonates with what has occurred in 
the Northern Territory since 2007. Shore (2011a: 169) explores:  
                                                
11  On 28 November 2012 this report was tabled in the Australian Senate in response to an order for the 
production of documents by the Australian Greens and endorsed by the Senate. See Postscript below. 
12  Our observations make clear that there is little prospect that measurable programmatic outcomes from the 
Intervention will be evident within such a short timeframe; few questions have been asked about value for 
money; the parameters of the Intervention have changed; and the Intervention was initially established without 
any clear policy or program logic. 
13  For some partial analyses see some essays in Altman and Hinkson (2010a), and some of the 454 submissions 
to the Stronger Futures Senate Inquiry, such as Slotte’s (2012) from Ramingining. 
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the idea of policy as a legal-rational tool of governance that simultaneously provides an instrument 
for the operation of state power … My concern is with how policy makers and politicians use 
policy to construct the public sphere, classify populations and define problems so that particular 
solutions appear natural and unavoidable, i.e., how policies are discursively managed in an attempt 
to control public debate and forge specific outcomes.   
 
Shore (2011a, 2011b) theorises policy as both ‘political technology’ and 
‘statecraft’. As such, while policies are inherently political, their political nature is 
disguised by neutral legal-rational idioms. Thus, power is disguised by making a 
particular discourse appear so ‘natural’ that its ideological content comes to be 
regarded as common sense and beyond question. Policy legitimises a particular course 
of action framed in terms of universal and unchallengeable principles, such as the 
right of children to a peaceful existence and a productive future based on education, 
and the right of impoverished Indigenous Australians to share in the nation’s wealth. 
Practices that are racialised and target particular groups in prescribed communities are 
justified by claims to such higher principles (like normalisation) or urgent policy 
priorities (like a ‘national emergency’ to eliminate child sexual abuse).  
The evaluation corpus: When is an evaluation an evaluation? 
Having located the evaluations literature within these analytic frames, we now turn to 
an exploration of the ‘evaluation corpus’. One of the methodological challenges that 
this review faced was the formidable task of classifying and listing the corpus of 
evaluations of the Intervention policy and its program elements. When Altman co-
presented the David Hunter Memorial Lecture in Canberra on 17 November 2011, he 
took along the eight evaluative reports released on the Intervention in the previous 
month. He physically stacked them up on the podium, a half metre in height, to give 
the audience a visual sense of the volume of material that is being made publicly 
available, and the challenge that this presents to proper analysis. When we began 
compiling our evaluation corpus we were aware that there was considerable 
Intervention auditing, bordering on what Sullivan (2011: 80) has termed ‘audit 
fetishism’. This is not surprising, given the political contestation over the 
Intervention14 and the high level of commitment to accountability for Intervention 
expenditure. 
In compiling the evaluations of the Intervention we realised that we would face a 
significant challenge, not just in locating all the reports, but also in reading them. In 
late 2011 we liaised with FaHCSIA and verified that our emerging database of 
evaluations not only matched theirs but seemed to be more inclusive. In the Appendix 
we list our evaluation corpus, including non-government sponsored evaluations that 
might be termed ‘independent’. There are also other reports listed that deal with the 
NPAs for Remote Service Delivery15 and Remote Indigenous Housing in the Northern 
Territory (Australian National Audit Office 2011), even though the Australian 
Government defines these reports as outside the remit of the Intervention. However, 
                                                
14  Contestation has occurred between the major political parties and some Aboriginal communities and 
spokespeople, the Australian Greens, some NGOs, sections of the academy, domestic advocacy and activist 
groups, and global human rights agencies like the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights 
15  This report series is by the Commonwealth and Northern Territory Coordinator-Generals for Remote Service 
Delivery that only deal with 16 and 21 Northern Territory communities respectively. The position of the 
Northern Territory Coordinator-General for Remote Services was abolished by the incoming Mills Country 
Liberal Government on 6 October 2012. 
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our information remains far from complete. For example, we would like to know what 
these reports cost and why a number are not publicly available. Reasons we have been 
given include purported or negotiated confidentiality. In this context, new Freedom of 
Information laws and Senate Estimate protocols suggest that more and more 
information will become publicly available over time.16  
Demarcations of what should be included and excluded are difficult to make, 
especially in the area of income management, which has been such a central concern 
of the Intervention and its redesign. As such, we include reports on income 
management in our evaluations list, even though the Australian Government now 
recommends its exclusion as an Intervention measure. We do not include numerous 
reports that review Indigenous policy nationally, such as standard outputs from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, which cannot be disaggregated to the Northern 
Territory level,17 or that are statistically unreliable at that level.18 Nor do we include 
the Prime Minister’s annual report since 2009 to the Australian Parliament on 
progress in Closing the Gap, the Productivity Commission’s biennial Overcoming 
Indigenous Disadvantage reports for 2007, 2009 and 2011, or the massive Strategic 
Review of Indigenous Expenditure February 2010 report released under a Freedom of 
Information application in August 2011. In addition, while we do list seven reports 
from Senate Inquiries into the NTER, we do not list the literally hundreds of 
submissions received by them, with the Stronger Futures Senate Inquiry receiving 
over 500, nor do we list the over 200 submissions received by the Review of the 
Intervention (Yu, Ella-Duncan and Gray 2008). 
In seeking to compile our evaluation corpus, we have hence focused on 
government and independent reports that might be defined as monitoring, auditing or 
reporting the Intervention. In the space available here we cannot provide an analysis 
of all these evaluations. However, the sheer number of reports that we list in the 
Appendix is staggering and has escalated: one in 2007; 17 in 2008; 18 in 2009; 22 in 
2010; 29 in 2011; and 11 to October 2012 – a total of 98 reports. Note that this is 
more than double the 41 items listed by the online Closing the Gap Clearing House 
being developed by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and the Australian 
Institute of Family Studies. 
Observations about the evaluation corpus 
It has become clear to us that attempting a systematic review of unsystematic policy 
development and review processes would be counterproductive. Hence our aim is not 
to systematically review the evaluation corpus or assess the relative value of different 
categories of report, whether classified by authorship, independence from 
government, size, cost or any other variable. Instead, we make critical observations 
about the evaluation corpus as a whole in the hope of drawing wider evidence-based 
conclusions about the nature and logic of evaluation in the context of a highly 
politicised area of policy.19  
                                                
16  For example, a report by ARTD and WestwoodSpice (2010) only made publicly available on 28 November 
2012. 
17  For example, the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey undertaken by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics in 1994, 2002 and 2008. 
18  For example, the annual Labour Force Characteristics of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians 
survey undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
19  Our references are coded in the following two sections of the article to allow easy cross-reference to the list in 
the Appendix. 
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A quick scan of the evaluations listed shows that there is extraordinary diversity in 
the range of issues covered, populations surveyed, jurisdictions targeted, and 
timeframes of the assessments. The most comprehensive coverage is presented in a 
series of Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory Monitoring Reports that are 
defined as ‘whole-of-government’ (see A2009b; A2010a; A2010b; A2011a; A2011b; 
A2012g). The problem with these reports is that they mainly focus on outputs and 
provide information for different populations. Other reports are very specific, 
focusing, for example, on the child health check initiative (A2008k; A2009k) or the 
school nutrition program (A2009m). Timelines and repetitions are ad hoc. Some 
reports are repeated, such as the six-monthly monitoring reports or those of 
Commonwealth (A2009c; A2010c; A2011c; A2011d; A2012h) or Northern Territory 
Coordinators-General (A2009d; A2010d; A2010e; A2011e; A2012i). These provide 
some prospects for tracking absolute changes over time, even if only in outputs. Other 
evaluations are one-offs, such as the review of the Alcohol Management Plan in 
Tennant Creek (A2010s), although there is nothing precluding repeat evaluations that 
might treat an apparent one-off evaluation as a baseline.  
Observation 1: Evaluation fetishism replacing logic 
Roughley (2009, 7) defines program logic in the following way:  
Program logic is an approach to program planning. It captures the rationale behind a program, 
probing and outlining the anticipated cause-and-effect relationships between program activities, 
outputs, intermediate outcomes and longer term desired outcomes. Program logic is usually 
represented as a diagram or matrix that shows a series of expected consequences, not just a 
sequence of events. Program logic expresses how change is expected to occur.  
It is widely acknowledged in the evaluations literature that a well-articulated 
program logic is essential if a program or policy is to be effectively evaluated. Ideally, 
a program logic is developed in the development and planning stage, so that the 
subsequent implementation and effects of the program can be evaluated against it. In 
other words, it should be an ex ante exercise that sets the basis for future evaluations 
(Funnell and Rogers 2011). 
The absence of program logic for the NTER has been obscured through the sheer 
quantity of evaluations, a move we term ‘evaluation fetishism’. This has allowed the 
Australian Government ‘flexibility’ in the framing of evaluations. For example, the 
NTER redesign consultations undertaken in July and August 2009 framed important 
discussions around income management, without considering the possibility that the 
program might be abolished. Later, when the Discussion Paper Stronger Futures in 
the Northern Territory was released in 2011, a senior government official revealed in 
Senate Estimates (Hansard, Supplementary Budget Estimates 2011–2012, Cross 
Portfolio Indigenous Matters, 22–23) that departmental officials had drafted it 
 
based on a scan of the issues that we expect would need to be addressed, bearing in mind the fact 
that over four years there has been a report chaired by Peter Yu, a series of consultations on the 
2009 reforms to the NTER legislation, and then this 2011 consultation. In a sense, the issues 
selected themselves, but the strict answer to your question is that the department prepared the 
discussion paper.  
 
The absence of transparent and readily available program logic has meant that 
much Intervention monitoring and evaluation has focused on outputs rather than 
outcomes, and at times conflated outputs and outcomes. For example, much of the 
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reporting on income management has quantified the numbers on BasicsCard or the 
total amount of income quarantined as outputs (A2009b; A2010a; A2010b; A2011a, 
A2011b; A2012g), but there has been almost no attempt to provide information on 
outcomes (healthier people). According to the Magenta Book (2011, 11) published by 
the UK Treasury, ‘A logic model describes the theory, assumptions and evidence 
underlying the rationale for a policy. It does this by linking the intended outcomes 
(both short and long term) with the policy inputs, activities, processes and theoretical 
assumptions’. The confusion and conflation in Intervention evaluations between 
outputs and outcomes distorts any clear logic model.  
As noted in the NTER Evaluation Report 2011 (A2011y), the possibility of 
observing sustainable outcomes after just four years of Intervention would be limited. 
We find almost no evaluation that clearly specifies a logic model for evaluation; 
A2010n outlining a framework for evaluating income management is the only 
exception. A key area where evaluation logic is missing is in any attempt to assess 
whether the Intervention is actually effective in Closing the Gap in the Northern 
Territory.20 Most of the evaluation reports are properly and heavily qualified with 
caveats that warn that it is unlikely that short-term socioeconomic change will be 
observed in situations of deeply entrenched disadvantage (A2011y).  
However, the acknowledgement of these short-term limitations on monitoring 
change raises the important question of why monitoring has been undertaken and 
publicised on a six-monthly basis. This is a process of ‘evaluation fetishism’. Part of 
the reason for evaluation fetishism can be linked to the highly political nature of the 
Intervention and a need for governments to show that progress is being made. This 
has especially been the case in areas like housing, where changing the institutional 
architecture (from community to public ownership and management of housing) has 
been expensive and protracted (A2011j). Yet evaluation fetishism as a substitute for 
policy logic is a double-edged sword. Regular reporting has had a political purpose, 
but has also carried political risk. Apparent short-term improvements, lauded as 
evidence that the Intervention is working, have been followed by plunging reversals, 
for example in fluctuating school attendance figures (A2009b; A2010a; A2010b; 
A2011a, A2011b; A2012g). 
Observation 2: Evaluating evidence and outcomes  
A close reading of evaluation and monitoring reports reveals two types of conflicting 
evidence.  
First, there can be conflicting evidence in quantitative outputs. For example, six-
monthly monitoring reports show increases in employment as, simultaneously, there 
is an increase in the number of welfare dependents (A2012g). The latter might reflect 
population growth or better welfare coverage, but such possibilities are not explored. 
Similarly, six-monthly reports provide information on increased investments in 
education that sit alongside information of stagnant, fluctuating or declining school 
attendance.  
Second, the absence of baseline or control data (see below) means that there is a 
high reliance on qualitative or self-assessment data. There is a well-documented 
potential for qualitative assessments to contradict quantitative measures among 
                                                
20  This terminology was possibly borrowed from the Northern Territory Government’s Closing the Gap of 
Indigenous Disadvantage: A Generation Plan of Action (the Martin Government’s comprehensive responses to 
the Little Children are Sacred report in August 2007) that was superseded by the Commonwealth-inspired 
COAG Closing the Gap framework in 2008. 
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Indigenous peoples. Anderson and Sibthorpe (1996) provide an early example: self-
assessment of health status as ‘high’ can be in marked variance to clinical data on 
morbidity and disease prevalence. Similarly, in the comprehensive Community Safety 
and Wellbeing Research Study (A2011aa), respondents were of the view that school 
attendance was rising, whereas quantitative school attendance figures from schools 
suggested stagnating or declining rates of attendance at the same time (A2011b). In 
the same vein, respondents might indicate that the lack of availability of police is a 
major problem, when data on number of police suggests a growing presence 
(A2011aa). 
It is well known in the evaluations literature that it is extremely difficult to assess 
whether an observed outcome was caused by a particular intervention, known as the 
‘attribution problem’ (McDavid 2009). This is especially the case when an 
intervention is holistic, as is the case with the NTER, and when both quantitative and 
qualitative measurements are used to indicate outputs or outcomes (they become 
conflated). Some might argue that it does not matter as long as the outcome is 
positive, but what if it is ambiguous or negative? There is considerable evidence of 
increased expenditure on the provision of health services and policing but, 
simultaneously, there is quantitative evidence of higher rates of hospitalisation for 
children, and there are more reports of violence (A2010b; A2011a, A2011b; A2012g). 
It is unclear whether the aim of more health checks and more policing is to increase or 
reduce hospitalisation and reported domestic violence. There are clearly major 
problems in making a strong link between interventions and outcomes. Such 
ambiguities are not surprising given poor outcomes reporting frameworks and also the 
complexity of the circumstances relating to the NTER. 
In the recently published Australian Government Coordination Arrangements for 
Indigenous Programs report, the ANAO (2012, 95) is highly critical in a general 
sense of the absence of what it refers to as ‘contribution analysis’ in Indigenous 
programs. It highlights that methods have been developed in Canada as long ago as 
1999 to use performance measures rigorously to assess contributions. 
Observation 3: Controlling evaluations 
One of the dangers of a high level of monitoring and evaluation is the risk of adverse 
or unwelcome findings. When these have occurred in the government’s own reports 
or commissioned consultancies they have either been ignored or hidden. One example 
of this is the major area of Safe Communities. The latest report for the period July–
December 2011 indicates that attempted suicide and self-harm reports increased from 
57 in 2007 to 261 in 2011 (A2012g). This is a particularly worrying statistic, but there 
are many other areas of personal harm, assaults, restraining orders, reports of child 
abuse, and trends in child protection indicators where trends appear to be negative. 
One response from the Australian Government is that it reflects better policing and 
reporting, without due acknowledgment that the Intervention is about improving 
community safety, not increasing incarceration. Another example is the Community 
Safety and Wellbeing Research Project (A2011aa), which reported that, on aspects of 
community safety and community functioning, there was a statistically significant 
‘inverse linear relationship between the proportion who perceived an improvement 
and population size’. This finding was buried because so much policy is focusing on 
the larger ‘priority communities’ and Territory Growth Towns.  
When Altman (2009b) published an opinion editorial in November 2009 
highlighting this deterioration in the government’s own monitoring report, he received 
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an email from Minister Macklin’s office asking: ‘Did you consider that the increased 
reporting of violence could be a result of substantially increased police presence on 
the ground? Many of these places did not have a proper police presence before. The 
headline should read reported violence is up, not violence is up’. Semantic niceties 
aside, it is genuinely difficult to tell what is happening in the area of community 
safety: the absence of any ‘contribution analysis’ makes it hard to know what 
proportion of the increase might be due to increased policing. Under such 
circumstances, it is impossible to measure the validity of output statistics.  
The Australian Government’s releases to the media are carefully crafted to 
emphasise the positive. The most recent Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory 
Monitoring Report (A2012g) was accompanied by a media release titled ‘Delivering 
more jobs and job opportunities for Aboriginal people’ (Macklin 2012a), which 
highlighted a set of random outputs delivered in the previous six months (actually 
July to December 2011), including 3,183 breakfasts and 4,511 lunches across 73 
communities through the School Nutrition Program, rather than reporting on other 
relevant data such as escalating attempted suicide and self-harm. 
Another way to control public reception of evaluation reports is to control the 
evaluations themselves. A high proportion of evaluations are either undertaken by 
government departments or by consultants to terms of reference developed by the 
Australian Government. While the evaluations literature indicates that this is not an 
unusual practice, it does raise questions about the independence of research, 
especially when the word ‘independent’ is used. For example, the two most 
comprehensive reviews that book-ended the Intervention were completed in October 
2008 (A2008c) and November 2011 (A2011y). The membership of both review 
groups was selected by the government, funded by the government and had secretariat 
support provided by the government. In the former case, there was a view articulated 
in the media that the original report had been amended, compromising its 
independence (Toohey 2008). In the latter case, an email from a senior official dated 
26 October 2011 noted that: ‘a comprehensive and independent evaluation of the 
NTER including the funding measures in the NPA is underway and led by the 
Performance and Evaluation Branch in FaHCSIA’.  
The controversial nature of the Intervention has meant that the government has 
been keen to retain a firm hand on the evaluations tiller. It is not clear if evaluations 
undertaken by government or paid consultants are peer reviewed in any way. Very 
few evaluations have been independent from government, with resourcing clearly an 
issue. Such reports, especially those by academic researchers at Jumbunna Indigenous 
House of Learning at the University of Technology, Sydney (A2008p; A2009i; 
A2010m; A2011cc; A2012e), and advocacy groups such as Concerned Australians 
(A2011x; A2011z) or the Equality Rights Alliance (A2011f), have produced very 
different results from those by government or its consultants – an issue returned to 
below.  
It is possible that the large number of official evaluations has crowded out other 
forms of community-controlled evaluations. At times there has been such heightened 
political sensitivity, especially around consultation-based evaluation, that the 
Australian Government has commissioned consultants CIRCA (A2008g; A2009h; 
A2011w) and O’Brien Rich (A2011v) to undertake qualitative and quantitative 
evaluations of the evaluation/consultation processes. Some agencies are independent, 
including the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) (A2009q; A2010j; A2011g; 
A2011l), the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Library, but either 
make limited public criticism (ANAO) or – as with the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
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(A2010j; A2011g; A2011l) – provide hard-hitting critique that is focused on 
administrative issues and Aboriginal client complaint. 
Observation 4: Discrediting evaluations 
A somewhat different approach is taken with independent research that delivers 
unwelcome findings: the Government appears to discredit it. The most extreme 
example of such an approach has been thoroughly documented by Cox (2011) in the 
Journal of Indigenous Policy. Peer reviewed research by Brimblecombe et al. (2010), 
published in the Medical Journal of Australia, questioned the efficacy of income 
management using the only before and after (longitudinal) study undertaken to date. It 
concluded that in 10 community stores, income management failed to reduce sales of 
tobacco, cigarettes and soft drinks or increase sales of fresh fruit and vegetables. This 
was an extremely unpopular finding, and the Australian Government quickly 
commissioned work to counter these claims. Its response did not gather additional 
evidence, but sought to discredit Brimblecombe et al.’s peer reviewed research. 
Although the government-commissioned report critiquing this study was cited in the 
final evaluation of the Intervention (Australian Government 2011b, 342), the report 
itself is not available to the public (A2010s). 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s office has also experienced what could be 
interpreted as the Government’s displeased response to criticism. The Office was 
allocated additional resources to be able to respond to Intervention-linked complaints 
from residents of remote communities, where English literacy levels are low and 
communications can be difficult. Its Indigenous Unit regularly contributed to six-
monthly monitoring reports. The Office also recently published two major reports 
(A2012b; A2012d) on income management decisions and remote housing reform, 
which are highly critical of Australian and Northern Territory Government agencies, 
including FaHCSIA. On 30 June 2012, when the NPA to Close the Gap in the 
Northern Territory concluded, the Indigenous Unit found itself unfunded, with the 
implication made that the special needs of Indigenous clients could now be 
‘normalised’ through mainstreaming of this previously specialised service. 
Observation 5: Evaluating change  
As a general rule, monitoring and evaluation reports are highly descriptive and make 
few recommendations (at least publicly) for change, especially if undertaken by 
government agencies or hired consultants (see for example A2011y). There are 
exceptions here; those with statutory roles at arm’s length from government are more 
likely to make recommendations for change, especially in program implementation, 
rather than policy-framing. This has been evident in reports from the Commonwealth 
Coordinator-General for Remote Service Delivery (A2009c; A2010c; A2011c; 
A2011d; A2012h), who made recommendations echoed by Al-Yaman and Higgins 
(2011) that emphasise the need for community involvement and engagement. The 
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Indigenous Unit has highlighted problems with 
income management and housing tenancy arrangements (A2012b; A2012d). Finally, 
the ANAO always makes recommendations for change, even if only at the 
administrative margins.  
Yet in order to evaluate whether positive change is occurring from a significantly 
increased expenditure on targeted Intervention programs, it is essential to establish a 
baseline against which to measure change. The ‘national emergency’ nature of the 
Intervention and its ad hoc policy development origins not only subverted democratic 
 Evaluations of the NTER Intervention  14 
accountability, but also set in train an unusual set of repercussions, including hyper-
auditing by the new government. It is hard to recapture today the high drama of 21 
June 2007, including the decision to deploy military forces to remote communities as 
part of ‘Operation Outreach’. From the outset in 2007, Boyd Hunter was already 
warning that evaluation without either a baseline or control communities would make 
objective evaluation extremely difficult. The NTER Review Board (2008) made 
similar observations when it handed down its report. Datasets that extend back before 
the NTER, for example on child hospitalisation rates (A2012g), do provide some 
comparative information that shows no discernible change before and after 2007. The 
absence of quantitative baseline data has resulted in far too much reliance on outputs 
as a crude proxy for outcomes, and on responses heavily influenced by the framing of 
questions.21  
One important source of official information is 2011 Census data, which will be 
comparable with pre-Intervention 2006 Census data at the individual community 
level. As this article is being completed, we await third release (28 March 2013) data 
that will allow community-by-community analysis of changes between 2006 and 
2011. Such analysis will allow measurement of absolute change in Indigenous well-
being, as well as comparative change following the Intervention, in accord with 
COAG’s normative Closing the Gap criteria. An early example of such analysis using 
official statistics at the Northern Territory level (Altman 2012b) shows little closing 
of statistical ‘gaps’ between 2006 and 2011. 
Discussion  
Governments regularly adopt and sustain policies for political reasons that have little to do with 
the stated evidence. In such cases, government-provided evidence becomes the official rationale 
for decisions rather than part of their actual justification ... Governments are often looking for 
evidence that will best support their predetermined policies rather than the best evidence on 
which to ground their yet-to-be-determined policies (Mulgan 2006, 6). 
 
Our task in this review has not been to assess the success (or failure) of the 
Intervention, but to examine the role that evaluation and evidence play in its political 
framing. As Marsh and McConnell (2010a, 581) note, whatever dimension of success 
is being considered, there are significant complexities in the assessment process. We 
have demonstrated these in our observations about the NTER evaluations. These 
observations raise important questions about the purpose of auditing and evaluation 
given that the Government appears unwilling to countenance any change in the 
fundamentals of the Intervention, and that its own hefty evaluation report (Australian 
Government 2011b) notes that it is unlikely to discern any sustainable change in 
outcomes in the short-term.  
It is not that such evaluation comes cheap: at a seminar held at the Australian 
National University in December 2011 to present an earlier version of this article, a 
senior government official in attendance volunteered off-the-cuff that evaluation 
might represent a standard rule-of-thumb 3-5 per cent of the $2 billion spend, possibly 
$60-100 million over the five year period of the Intervention. In the context of the 
Intervention and its aftermath, where $500 million is to be spent on income 
management, up to $500 million on changing the architecture for remote Indigenous 
housing administration in the Northern Territory, and $200 million on the institution 
                                                
21  This is evident in conflicting views about the integrity of consultations over Intervention redesign in 2009 
(A2009i) and Stronger Futures in 2011 (A2011v; A2012e). 
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of the Government Business Manager, this may not seem like a particularly 
significant amount. However, it is still reasonable to ask what all the evaluation has 
achieved and why it has been undertaken.  
To answer this question, we return to our analytic frames. Referring back to Marsh 
and McConnell (2010a), the political dimension of Intervention ‘success’ raises 
important questions about the diverse and contradictory political reference points by 
which success is measured, and the role of evaluation in determining this success. As 
noted earlier, though there is a difference between the initial Coalition approach and 
that of the Australian Labor Party, the Rudd and Gillard Governments have been 
eager to maintain Intervention bipartisanship. From the Gillard Government’s 
perspective, the Intervention has been a political success because the Government has 
managed to transform it to incorporate discourses of human rights and Closing the 
Gap development. At the same time, that transformation has seen the successful 
negotiation of the continuation of Intervention elements for a further 10 years, with a 
legislated funding commitment of $3.4 billion. It could be argued that the ‘official’ 
evaluation strategy has facilitated a transformation of the Intervention from Closing 
the Gap in the Northern Territory to Stronger Futures. However, this political success 
has its ambiguities, both domestically and globally. In August 2012 there was a 
change in government in the Northern Territory, the first since 2001. The 
dissatisfaction of rural electorates with aspects of the Intervention may have been one 
explanation of the wholesale transfer of elected Indigenous members to the 
conservative Country Liberal Party, although others interpret the election result as 
support for continued income management (Langton 2012). The impact of this change 
of government on the national political landscape will become clearer in 2013.  
At the level of ‘process success’ the Australian Government sought process 
transparency through an apparently high level of community consultation for NTER 
redesign in 2009, and then for the NTER transition to Stronger Futures in 2011. In 
both cases, the Government undertook extensive but rushed consultations, eager to 
find evidence of policy approval that could be reframed as success to support policy 
positions outlined in consultation discussion papers (see A2009i). This has been 
possible, as already noted, because the Government framed consultation processes 
within tight parameters. This apparent process success, however, is strongly contested 
by counter-narratives emerging from consultations that were not tightly controlled. 
Hence, academic researchers (mainly from Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning) 
and activist organisations (Stop the Intervention Collective, Sydney) were able to 
provide very different, sometimes diametrically opposed, community perspectives 
when shadowing government consultation. This has especially been the case on 
contentious issues such as income management and linking welfare payments to 
school attendance (A2012e). 
Two Senate Inquiries generated evidence of process problems that cannot be easily 
dismissed. The first was in relation to legislation that sought to continue income 
management in compliance with the Racial Discrimination Act (Community Affairs 
Legislation Committee 2010; A2010v); the second in relation to the continuation of 
the Intervention in its ‘Stronger Futures’ manifestation (Community Affairs 
Legislation Committee 2012; A2012k). Both Inquiries made it clear that the 
Australian Government was not interested in evidence-based policy making, if views 
from a range of stakeholders made in written submission and by expert witnesses 
could be deemed evidence. As Cox (A2011c; 2012) has demonstrated, in both cases, 
almost all the written and oral evidence opposed the Government and Opposition 
positions. Even more significant was the verbal evidence taken by the Senate 
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committee in the Northern Territory that contradicted the views the Government had 
gleaned from its consultation processes.  
These examples demonstrate that attempting to assess or measure political and 
process success in the context of the Intervention is controversial, fraught and open to 
multiple interpretations. Moreover, as the absence of any initial overarching policy 
logic has indicated, the overall purpose and motive of the Intervention has been 
unclear. Using an anthropological perspective on power and policy processes 
(exemplified through the work of Shore (2011a) and Hyatt (2011), as well as Lattas 
and Morris (2010) in Australia), we interpret the broad goal of Intervention policy as 
rapidly transitioning residents of remote communities in the Northern Territory to 
normalisation, now metaphorically captured by the goal to Close the Gap. However, 
this political goal has been obscured. Shore (2011a) notes that, as policies are 
inherently political, so the role of the state in creating and reproducing poverty and 
politico-structural causes of inequality is hidden, while press releases and media 
coverage do the work of normalising the ideological content of Intervention issues. In 
the case of the NTER, the following rhetorical questions have been constantly 
repeated: Shouldn’t Aboriginal kids live safely? And go to school? Shouldn’t welfare 
provided by the state be spent sensibly? Shouldn’t Aboriginal populations be properly 
policed like other citizens? Shouldn’t Aboriginal people be educated and trained to 
work like other Australians? Such rhetorical devices enshrine Intervention ideologies 
in the everyday, rendering them a matter of common sense and indeed of basic human 
rights and needs. 
What our focus on policy framing seeks to highlight is its fundamental connections 
to subsequent monitoring, auditing and evaluation. What is different about the latest 
in a series of Indigenous interventions is that today, new technologies of surveillance 
allow the state to monitor many aspects of everyday life: work, schooling, child 
health, public housing occupancy, access to welfare, and household expenditure. 
These are linked to new policies, like income management, school attendance 
measures and new housing tenancy arrangements, and generate an extraordinary 
quantum of data (of varying quality) for evaluation.  
At the same time, this technocratic approach and deployment of state power is 
neither uniform nor monolithic. As Shore (2011b) notes, the modern state is rarely a 
unified, coherent or homogenous actor. Both hyper-reporting and diversity are 
features of the detailed six-monthly Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory 
Monitoring Report. It provides information across seven broad measures by a 
combination of four lead Commonwealth portfolios, and different areas within them, 
as well as the Ombudsman’s Office. This diversity provides space for some agencies 
to ‘call it as it is’ but then allow the political leadership to do the interpreting for the 
media, which has the overall effect of minimising diversity and dissent. 
And yet factual reporting by government agencies can reveal fractures and failures, 
destabilising and calling into question the link between evaluation and success. 
Importantly it can often act to obscure the issues at hand. The last six-monthly 
monitoring report released on 20 June 2012 (A2012g) exposes such conflict in much 
reporting. Bearing in mind that the focus of the Intervention is on only 45,000 
Indigenous people, the report tells us that 22,729 adults are on some form of income 
support (oddly reported in a section on Economic Participation) and, of these, 17,215 
(76 per cent) are income managed. This represents an extraordinary level of scrutiny. 
Information on how much income has been managed ($654.3 million since 2007, with 
$631.5 million spent) is of no relevance to the supposedly targeted underlying issues 
of the wellbeing of children. In addition, as noted earlier, the focus of the media spin 
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about this report quite intentionally obfuscates and deflects attention from any 
negatives, focusing instead on ‘Delivering more jobs and job opportunities for 
Aboriginal people’, with Minister Macklin (2012a) emphasising that since 2007, 
2,241 real jobs have been created in government service delivery positions. Not only 
has the sustainability of these jobs already been questioned by the ANAO (A2011o), 
but such media statements depoliticise what are clearly important issues of 
performance accountability. 
Perhaps most importantly, as the Australian Government has deployed its power to 
make policy and to invest heavily in a new institutional architecture, it has sought to 
evaluate this framework on its own terms. This does several things. First, it serves to 
further naturalise a dominant narrative of policy as ‘the’ framework, as outlined for all 
Indigenous Australians by the Productivity Commission (Steering Committee for the 
Review of Government Service Provision 2011, 13). This framework focuses on the 
six COAG targets matching six headline indicators that are linked to seven strategic 
areas for action to be measured and monitored by 37 sets of indicators. This sits 
alongside the Intervention’s seven measures and 36 sub-measures, all devised 
unilaterally by the Australian Government. This renders a deeply-entrenched 
development problem into a hyper-technical monitoring exercise. What is more, this 
framing has penetrated policy discourse down to the local level, so that what are 
termed Local Implementation Plans in priority communities in the Northern Territory 
are all based on abstract Closing the Gap targets, without any concrete reference to 
what baseline evidence is to be used. 
Second, the plethora of quantitative statistics generated by these new monitoring 
tools means that there is little focus on more qualitative and locally relevant measures 
of performance. There is a growing emphasis in a number of monitoring and 
evaluation reports that the form of Intervention matters, not just the quantum. The 
need to engage and empower local communities has been increasingly emphasised by 
what may be termed semi-autonomous agencies – the Steering Committee for the 
Review of Government Service Provision (2011), the AIHA/AIFS Closing the Gap 
Clearing House (2011), and the reports of Commonwealth and Northern Territory 
Coordinators-General.22 But these broad issues of governance and self-management, 
what might be termed ‘intangibles’ in the context of quantitative evaluation, have no 
place in the overarching framing of Intervention evaluation. 
Finally, evaluation leaves some critically important issues unanswered. Through 
our assessment of evaluations it becomes increasingly obvious that ‘success’ is 
impossible to measure in such contested political spaces. Indeed the very legitimacy 
of the goals of the Intervention is questionable in such intercultural and diverse 
domains of what were termed, until recently, ‘prescribed communities’. We cannot 
know if the quantum allocated to the Intervention’s normalisation and Closing the 
Gap projects is adequate, given no objective needs assessment has been undertaken. 
And considering the latest (and last) report of the Northern Territory Coordinator-
General (2012) has questioned how much of the overall expenditure is actually 
reaching people in need, it would appear that the infrastructure and mode of delivery, 
with its heavy bureaucratic emphasis, is ineffective. The overall logic of the NTER 
and its evaluation seem fraught: the link between evidence and policy formation is 
weak. If measures are working effectively at the programmatic level, are there policy 
grounds for maintaining the Intervention? Conversely, if evidence shows that 
measures are ineffective, are there grounds for fundamentally changing its form? Or 
                                                
22  Their mandates in the Northern Territory only require a focus on 15 priority communities and 21 Territory 
Growth Towns respectively. 
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perhaps, as Waterford (2011) asks with respect to Stronger Futures laws, if the 
medicine is not working is it time to double the dose?  
Conclusion: Too much Dreaming 
We conclude our review by deploying the idiom of ‘Too Much Dreaming’. In an 
earlier essay on the Intervention and risk society, it was noted that Aboriginal people 
do not necessarily behave like other Australians and may not be motivated by the 
same aspirations (Altman and Hinkson 2010b, 188–189). The ideology of the 
Dreaming, the body of social law that explains the creation of the universe and 
people’s relationships within it, is still vitally important for many Aboriginal people 
in remote Australia; it is the embodiment of creation that gives meaning to everything. 
In the Northern Territory, most of the 45,000 people who are the subject of the 
Intervention still speak Aboriginal languages (Biddle 2012), and almost all live on 
Aboriginal-owned land, claimed on the basis that people retain primary spiritual 
responsibility for sacred Dreaming sites, embedded in the landscape. The Dreaming 
encapsulates reference to customary norms that the Intervention in its original form 
sought to rapidly replace with Western norms – there was, according to the 
Government, just too much Dreaming for late modernity. While the form that the 
Intervention has taken might have altered nominally, there is an abiding sense in 
which its overall framing is cast in very mainstream Closing the Gap developmental 
aspirations. In all the evaluations to date, there has been too little attention paid to the 
ethnocentric nature of the Intervention and to the cross-cultural tensions inherent in 
defining its goals and evaluating its outcomes.  
It appears that too much evaluation has been undertaken in a very short time. The 
Australian Government, the driver of both the Intervention and the national 
Indigenous reform process, does too much dreaming, hopeful that progress is being 
made – despite the fact that the Intervention had no foundational, evidence-based 
policy logic, and no baseline against which to measure improvements. Early analysis 
of 2011 Census data (so far the only relatively objective data to measure progress 
according to the normative parameters dictated by the Australian Government) 
indicates next to no change across the Northern Territory between 2006 and 2011 
(Altman 2012b). With time and further detailed analysis these official statistics will 
reveal just what has been achieved between 2006 and 2011, an inter-census period 
that roughly approximates the five years of the Intervention (2007–2012).  
All this raises important questions about what purpose evaluation fetishism in the 
context of the Intervention might have served, beyond the political sphere where there 
is broad consensus between the two major parties. In such circumstances, the hyper-
evaluation is not about accountability. In The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, 
Power (1999) sees the explosion in the audit industry at the turn of the 21st century as 
an institutional means of societal comfort production. Our review suggests that the 
unprecedented evaluation associated with the national emergency Intervention in the 
Northern Territory accords to some extent with this observation. In this sense, the 
Intervention is just as much about mainstream Australians as Indigenous Australians, 
used as a means of persuading and comforting them that something productive is 
being done by the Australian Government with unprecedented financial commitments 
to address acute problems in remote Indigenous Australia. It is also about the exercise 
of power to impose a particular type of highly experimental policy and an associated 
paternalistic set of programs to naturalise the ideological intent of governing remote 
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Indigenous subjects. This governance is undertaken through normalising Indigenous 
Australians in accord with an idealised neoliberal authoritarian ‘law and order 
society’ trope (Hyatt 2011).  
Given such a political impetus behind the Intervention, evaluation becomes another 
technique of governmentality and an obfuscating tool. Evaluation in the context of the 
Intervention then has been effectively divorced from the issues it seeks to assess. This 
has consequences for public policy surrounding the next ten years of Intervention 
policies. As we have determined in our review, the Intervention has undergone many 
phases, faces and transformations, infusing it with cross-cutting objectives. For 
political elites who are rhetorically committed to ‘evidence-based policy making’ and 
‘evaluation’, this will only increase the reliance on evaluation and monitoring to 
legitimate changes in policy. However, this creates a self-perpetuating cycle – for 
example, the consequences of the recent ‘law and order’ trope being less than well-
received by Indigenous communities may trigger another onslaught of monitoring and 
evaluation. As we have argued in this review, this evaluation will likely have no 
correlation with ‘success’, improvement, or positive change for Indigenous 
Australians.  
Postscript 
Just as this article was completed, two events occurred worthy of brief documentation, 
owing to their deep resonance with the issues discussed here. 
First, after our numerous attempts to gain access to the Program Logic Options 
Report (ARTD Consultants and WestWood Spice 2010) over a six month period, it 
was finally made public on 28 November 2012. The process for this release occurred 
via a formal motion for the production of documents initiated by Senator Siewert. It 
was fulfilled by the Minister representing the Minister for Families, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs in the Senate.  
One can only speculate on why the Australian Government has been so sensitive 
about the release of this report two and a half years after its completion. What is clear, 
as noted earlier, is that it was prepared mainly in response to the NTER Review Board 
(2008) to try and develop some ex post facto program logic for the Intervention. This 
document was prepared with reference to the literature and consultations with 
Australian and Northern Territory Government stakeholders in late 2009, but with no 
consultation with, or direct observation of, prescribed community members. In the 
final NTER Evaluation Report 2011 (Australian Government 2011b), where the report 
is only referred to once, it is unclear whether it was made available to the numerous 
consultants who contributed to the final evaluation. There is certainly no evidence that 
the program logic for six themes proposed by ARTD Consultants and WestWood 
Spice was applied in any of the seven reports prepared for the final evaluation, despite 
its preparation to aid the whole-of-government evaluation of the NTER (Australian 
Government 2011b, 70). There is even an absence of direct correlation between the 
program logics prepared in 2009 and the evaluations conducted in 2011: as ARTD 
Consultants and WestWood Spice (2010, 5) note, both the NTER measures and the 
program logics will likely continue to evolve, an issue that we identified at the outset 
of our article. This invites the question of why the Program Logic Options Report was 
prepared in the first place, and raises the very serious issue of the disconnect between 
logic and evaluation outlined in our review.  
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Second, the Evaluating New Income Management in the Northern Territory: First 
Evaluation Report (Bray et al. 2012) was released by the Australian Government on 
29 November 2012, the last sitting day of parliament. This report had been with 
FaHCSIA since July 2012 and the reason for its release four months after its 
completion is not clear. This report is notable because FaHCSIA commissioned it 
from a consortium including academics from the University of New South Wales and 
the Australian National University, in marked contrast to almost all previous 
evaluations that had been commissioned from private sector consultants.  
This is not the place to seriously review this evaluation except to note, as we have 
throughout, that its aims and approach were very clearly framed by the Australian 
Government. The report itself is massive (350 pages) and extremely thorough. Again 
in concert with much that we have said earlier, there is very little correlation between 
the heavily qualified and guarded findings of the report, and the Media Release 
‘Income Management in the Northern Territory’ (Macklin 2012b). The release picks 
just a few apparently positive findings, such as a statistically significant perception of 
an improvement in the ability of income managed Indigenous people in the Northern 
Territory to afford food. No mention is made of the report’s overall conclusion that a) 
New Income Management (NIM) has had a diverse set of impacts (with some 
communities and many individuals feeling disempowered); b) it is not possible to 
make overarching conclusions about the impact of NIM as both positive and negative 
aspects need to be considered; and c) ultimately that any judgments about overall 
effectiveness need to take into account the program costs (Bray et al. 2012, xxiii, 
249). Here again evaluations are controlled and promoted as political successes while 
evidence is obfuscated. 
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 Appendix 1. Evaluations of the NTER Intervention 
Code Evaluation/report (link embedded) 
A2007 Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007 and four related bills concerning the Northern Territory National Emergency Response 
A2008a NTER Monitoring Report August 2007 – June 2008 
A2008b Draft ABS report on outcome indicators, potential data sources, and possible data redevelopment of NTER (mentioned in Monitoring Report above) * 
A2008c NTER Review Board Report (FaHCSIA) 
A2008d Final Report on the NTER Taskforce (FaHCSIA) 
A2008e First Report - Senate Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous Communities  
A2008f Inquiry into provisions of the Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Emergency Response Consolidation) Bill 2008 
A2008g CIRCA – Community feedback on the NTER (FaHCSIA) 
A2008h Survey of Government Business Managers (Oct 2008) (FaHCSIA-TNS Social Research) 
A2008i Alcohol and Other Drug Service Components of NTER (DoHA) 
A2008j Progress of the NTER Child Health Check Initiative: Health Conditions and Referrals (First Progress Report) (AIHW and DoHA) * 
A2008k Progress of the NTER Child Health Check Initiative: Preliminary Results from the Child Health Check and Follow-up Data Collections (Second Progress Report) (AIHW and 
DoHA) 
A2008l Review of the First Phase of the Petrol Sniffing Strategy. Primarily concerned with the period July 2006 to December 2007 and focuses in particular on the Northern Territory 
(Prepared by Urbis for FaHCSIA) 
A2008m Northern Territory Emergency Response: Perspectives from Six Communities (Central Land Council) 
A2008n A Community-Based Review of the NTER (Uni of Newcastle) 
A2008o Intervention: Experiences and Opinions of Alice Springs Town Camp Residents of the NTER (Tangentyere Council) 
A2008p ‘Welfare Payments and School Attendance’ (UTS/Jumbunna) 
A2008q Review of issues related to the acquisition and management of container accommodation in the Northern Territory and the management of ACMS on prescribed communities 
(FaHCSIA) 
A2009a NTER Monitoring Report July–December 2008 
A2009b Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory Monitoring Report January–June 2009 (FaHCSIA) 
A2009c Six Monthly Report July–November 2009 (Commonwealth Coordinator General for Remote Indigenous Services) 
A2009d Report #1 May–November 2009 (NT Coordinator-General for Remote Services) 
A2009e Second Report – Senate Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous Communities 
A2009f Third Report - Senate Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous Communities 
A2009g NTER Redesign Consultations Report (FaHCSIA) 
 A2009h Report on the NTER Redesign Engagement Strategy and Implementation: Final Report (FaHCSIA and CIRCA) 
A2009i ‘Will They be Heard?’ a Response to NTER Consultations June to August 2009 (Jumbunna) 
A2009j Police’s Taskforce Themis (NAAJA) 
A2009k Child Health Check Initiative – Final Progress Report (DoHA) 
A2009l Final Stores Post Licensing Monitoring Report (FaHCSIA) 
A2009m Findings of the School Nutrition Stakeholder Survey (DEEWR) 
A2009n Review of the Central Australian Petrol Sniffing Strategy Unit (Urbis for FaHCSIA and OIPC) 
A2009o Let’s Start: Exploring Together – An early intervention program for NT children and families – Final Evaluation Report 
A2009p NTER – FaHCSIA Asbestos Surveys: Communication Issues (Commonwealth Ombudsman) 
A2009q Final Evaluation Report for Safe Places (CDU) * 
A2009r Performance Audit of the School Nutrition Program (ANAO) 
A2010a Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory Monitoring Report July–December 2009 (FaHCSIA) 
A2010b Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory Monitoring Report January-–June 2010 (FaHCSIA) 
A2010c Six Monthly Report December 2009–August 2010 (Commonwealth Coordinator General for Remote Indigenous Services)  
A2010d Report #2 December 2009–May 2010 (NT Coordinator-General for Remote Services) 
A2010e Report #3 May–November 2010 (NT Coordinator-General for Remote Services) 
A2010f Fourth Report – Senate Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous Communities 
A2010g Final Report – Senate Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous Communities 
A2010h Development of program logic options for the NTER (ARTD Consultants and WestWood Spice) ** 
A2010i Report on the Evaluation of Income Management in the NT (FaHCSIA)  
A2010j Survey of Government Business Managers (2009) (FaHCSIA-TNS Social Research) 
A2010k Audit Report on GBMs (ANAO) 
A2010l Review Rights for Income Managed People in the Northern Territory (Commonwealth Ombudsman) 
A2010m CDEP case studies report (Jumbunna) 
A2010n Evaluation Framework for New IM (SPRC, ANU and AIFS) 
A2010o Independent Review of Policing in Remote Indigenous Communities in the NT (FaHCSIA) 
A2010p Impact of Income Management on Store Sales in the Northern Territory (Brimblecombe et al) 
A2010q Critique of the published statistical analysis in a study by the Menzies School of Medical Research (DSI Consulting) * 
A2010r Moving Beyond the Restrictions: The Evaluation of the Alice Springs Alcohol Management Plan (Menzies School of Health Research and Monash University) 
A2010s Managing alcohol in Tennant Creek, Northern Territory: an evaluation of the Tennant Creek Alcohol Management Plan and related measures to reduce alcohol-related problems 
(Menzies School of Health Research) 
 
 
 
A2010t "Growing Them Strong, Together" Inquiry into Child Protection System 
A2010u SEAM Evaluation Report (DEEWR) 
A2010v Inquiry into Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial Discrimination Act) Bill 2009 and the Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (2009 Measures) Bill 2009 along with the Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and 
Other Legislation Amendment (Restoration of Racial Discrimination Act) Bill 2009 (Standing Committees on Community Affairs) 
A2011a Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory Monitoring Report July-December 2010 (FaHCSIA) 
A2011b Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory Monitoring Report January-June 2011 
A2011c Six Monthly Report September 2010–March 2011 (Commonwealth Coordinator General for Remote Indigenous Services) 
A2011d Six Monthly Report April 2011–September 2011 (Commonwealth Coordinator General for Remote Indigenous Services)  
A2011e Report #4 December 2010–May 2011 (NT Coordinator General for Remote Services) 
A2011f Women’s Experience of Income Management in the Northern Territory (ERA)  
A2011g Dental Health of Indigenous Children in the Northern Territory – Findings from Closing the Gap Program (DoHA) 
A2011h Review of the Alcohol and Other Drug Service Components of the Northern Territory Emergency Response (DoHA-Origin and Bowchung) 
A2011i Northern Territory Night Patrols (ANAO) 
A2011j Implementation of the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing in the Northern Territory (ANAO)  
A2011k Talking in Language: Indigenous Interpreters and Government Communication (Commonwealth Ombudsman)  
A2011l Evaluation of Community Stores Licensing Program (FaHCSIA) 
A2011m ORIC report on stores (nation-wide) 
A2011n Evaluation of the Child Health Check Initiative and Expanding Health Services delivery Initiative (DoHA) 
A2011o Indigenous Employment in Government Service Delivery (ANAO) 
A2011p A Review of certain FaHCSIA-funded youth services (FaHCSIA-URBIS) 
A2011q Youth in Communities Interim Evaluation Report (FaHCSIA) 
A2011r Review of the Substance Intelligence Desk and Dog Operations Unit 
A2011s Evaluation of the Family Support Package: A Community Perspective (Batchelor Institute) * but requests for copies can be made here eprints.batchelor.edu.au/278/  
A2011t Mobile Child Protection Team Final Evaluation Report (Menzies School of Health Research) * 
A2011u Stronger Futures in the NT Report on Consultations (FaHCSIA) 
A2011v Stronger Futures Quantitative Analysis Report (O’Brien Rich) 
A2011w Report on Stronger Futures Consultation (CIRCA)  
A2011x ‘Cuts to Welfare Payments for School non-attendance: Requested or Imposed?’ (concerned Australians) 
A2011y NTER Evaluation Report (FaHCSIA, other bodies and consultants) 
A2011z Opinion: NTER Evaluation 2011 (concerned Australians) 
 *Reports marked in this way are either unavailable or were never publicly available. 
** Released 28 November 2012. 
 
A2011aa Community Safety and Wellbeing Research Study (FaHCSIA) 
A2011bb Community Safety: results from the service provider survey in the Northern Territory (FaHCSIA) 
A2011cc Eva Cox ‘Evidence Free policy making, the case of income management’ in The Journal of Indigenous Policy Issue 12 
A2012a Improving School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) Evaluation Report for 2010 
A2012b Review of Centrelink Income Management Decisions in the NT (Ombudsman) 
A2012c Is income management working? (Parliamentary Library) 
A2012d Remote housing reform in the NT (Ombudsman) 
A2012e ‘Listening but not Hearing’ (Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning) 
A2012f Dental health of Indigenous children in the Northern Territory: Progress of the Closing the Gap Child Oral Health Program up to December 2011 (AIHW) 
A2012g Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory Monitoring Report July–December 2011 
A2012h Six Monthly Report October 2011–March 2012 (Commonwealth Coordinator General for Remote Indigenous Services) 
A2012i Thalia Anthony/Harry Blagg report on crime 
A2012j Office of the Northern Territory Coordinator-General for Remote Services report: June 2011 to August 2012 
A2012k Senate Inquiry: Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2011 [Provisions], Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011 
[Provisions], Social Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2011 [Provisions] (Senate Standing Committees on Community Affairs) 
